Introduction
This paper explores the connections between globalization, competition, competition policy and competitiveness.
These concepts and the relationships between them have emerged as important issues in the current development debate at both national and international levels. The significance at the national level arises from the privatization and liberalization policies which have been adopted by many developing countries in recent decades. The international significance is directly related to globalization and the continuing deep integration of the world economy through multinational companies and fast growth of global trade.
The external dimension is at present particularly important because of the worldwide economic downturn. In these circumstances multinational companies and governments try to evade their international commitments by relaxing free competition in relation to particular coveted industries and products. The return of protection in advanced industrial countries is increasingly well documented, (see e.g. Evernett 2011). However it is not yet a major fault for the international competition system. In spite of the many difficulties of enforcing fairly rules of WTO, most advanced and emerging countries by and large work within the system and, so far, there are relatively few infringements of the rules.
Another reason for the importance of the global dimension is the failure of the Doha Round of trade negotiations which has made it more difficult for the relevant international institutions, such as the World Trade
Organisation, to further their agenda for free trade in the international marketplace as well as provide enough space for development for emerging countries. Appropriate and duly agreed and enforced competition policies comprise one way for the international organisations to achieve these objectives. However for such policies to work they have to overcome not only economic but also political issues which are complex and differ between countries.
Turning briefly to the concept of competition itself, it is central to neoclassical analysis and the theory of growth which follows from such a perspective. At the simplest level, competition theory asserts that those countries which have the highest rate of technical progress will also have the highest rate of growth. Further, the greater or more intense the competition, the greater the rate of technical progress. On the basis of these two relationships, the World Bank in its landmark 1991 World Development Report asserted 3 : "Competitive markets are the best way yet found for efficiently organising the production and distribution of goods and services. Domestic and external competition provides the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and technological progress."
This view is not universally accepted and will be challenged in this paper.
Similarly, competitiveness is a somewhat different concept than competition per se. In some polemical writings in the 1990s Paul Krugman (1994) (1995) (1996) made the notion of competitiveness famous by declaring it to be a dangerous obsession and termed it as 'pop internationalism'. Howes and Singh (1990) noted: 'with pop internationalism, he associates the idea that the recent ills of the US economyeroding real wages, stagnating living standards, rising inequality and unemploymentare the consequences of a major erosion of the industrial base due to international competition'. Krugman went on to claim that the notion of competitiveness might be useful when applied to a corporation but was utterly meaningless when applied to a nation. Krugman's analysis will be challenged in this essay and will be shown why, contrary to him, competitiveness is a useful concept and is important for economic policy.
So far we have introduced the two of the five concepts in the title of the paper. The third concept is that of competition policy. This consists of policies to change corporate conduct, structure and behaviour so as to maintain competition, national and international. Fourthly we introduce the question of globalisation. This has many different meanings for different people but in order to keep the discussion unambiguous this paper regards globalisation as consisting of free trade, free capital flows but not free labour markets 4 . The latter however are assumed to be flexible at the national level. We have adopted this procedure, not because it is correct in economic theory, but it is simply to make our analyses comparable with that of the World Bank and those of other orthodox economists. From an economic perspective, the more attractive methodology would assume free labour markets analogous with free capital markets.
The main purpose of the paper is to explore the relationship between these four concepts and economic development. The latter for reasons of space and not to lose the focus of this discussion, is taken to be simply economic growth. Agencies like the World Bank regard competition policy as essential for economic development. Implicit in the orthodox analysis is also the notion that the more competition the better. Or in other words, the optimal competition is the maximum competition. Both of these propositions are subject to challenge. This paper contributes by its conceptualisation of the main issues which arise in the modern discussion of competition and competition policies in economic development. It also contributes by its extensive treatment of the international dimensions of the subject. Most importantly, it is among the few papers which put economic development at the centre stage for competition and related policies. It also contributes by its proposal for establishment of a development-oriented international competition authority.
As there are a number of concepts being used in this essay, from a pedagogical point of view, it may be useful at this stage to provide a summary of the main conclusions:
 Even if they did not do so in the past, developing countries need a competition policy today, because of two main reasons.
 One, the advanced capitalist economies are subject periodically to gigantic international cross border as well as huge domestic merger movements. To cope with such mergers and protect themselves from involuntary and harmful takeovers of domestic firms, developing countries need a competition policy.
 Two, there are significant structural changes within developing countries themselves arising from privatisation and deregulation which many of these countries had accepted during the Washington consensus period.
 Unless regulatory changes are made, with privatisation there is a danger of replacing public monopolies with private monopolies. It is worth noting in this context that public monopolies are in general to be preferred to private monopolies for the simple reason that public monopolies often carry a legal injunction to advance the welfare of citizens. By contrast, the main objective of the private firm is to maximise shareholder value.
 In the first and only comprehensive study of the intensity of competition in emerging markets, Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) had reported the astonishing results that as conventionally measured, the intensity of competition is lower in the developed countries than in developing countries. Despite all the new methodology which has been introduced in recent years in the persistence of profitability studies, Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) results still stand for emerging markets. 5  The above is not just a statistical result but it has a solid economic foundation which is explained in the paper.
 Analysis and evidence indicates that maximum competition is not necessarily optimal, in terms of dynamic efficiency.
 There is little evidence that the international cross border merger waves of the period before the global crisis of 2008 to 2012 enhanced global 5 There are two other studies for persistence of profits in developing countries, one by Kambhampati (1995) and Yurtoglu (2004) . They are both for a single country, Kambhampati studied India and Yurtoglu studied Turkey.
economic efficiency any more than did the largely domestic merger waves before then. See Singh (2007) , Tichy (2010) and Scherer (1994) 6 .
 The current competition policies in the UK and the EU are unsuitable for developing countriescountries at different levels of development and governance capacities require different types of competition policies.
Nevertheless, developing countries have much to learn from the experience of Japan and Korea in blending competition policies with industrial policies.
 It is argued here that the present competition policy discourse, in which WTO plays a major role, is unfair to developing countries. The very concepts used in the WTO discussions in the international fora are prejudicial to the interests of developing countries. To make these concepts development friendly, a new language is required to replace the WTO concepts of most-favoured nation treatment, national treatment and market access.
 The paper presents a proposal for a development-oriented international competition authority to control anti-competitive conduct and growth by mergers of large multinational companies.
II. Competition Policy in Emerging Countries
We start our substantive discussion of emerging markets with the authors suggest that interest groups that benefit from initial industrial support policies will typically resist the introduction of competition laws and policies. were very few cases which were tried and which pertained to anti-trust.
Most cases, under MRTP, were concerned with consumer welfare issues, including many concerning the clarifications of the law. It remains to be seen how the competition law will work in a developing country with its own strong legal traditions. It may take another 10 years before it could be said that the country has a coherent competition policy.
Nevertheless the main reason why developing countries did not have competition policies in the past would appear to be that these were not much needed. This was in part due to considerable state control over economic activity and if the government thought there was anticompetitive behaviour by some corporations or industries it intervened directly and fixed prices such as for medicine and other essential products.
In addition state owned industries were not allowed to charge monopoly prices.
III. The State of Competition in Developing Countries
How much competition exists in developing countries? The popular impression is that developing country markets do not display much competition or rivalrous behaviour. There are numerous government created barriers to entry and exit, from an industry. Besides, there is underdeveloped infrastructure which makes the markets inefficient.
Fortunately there is some hard new empirical evidence which sheds some light on this issue. These relatively new studies use the persistence of profitability approach to measure the degree of competition in a market or in an economy as a whole. The basic methodology used in these studies is outlined below.
How should the intensity of competition in a jurisdiction be measured?
The current widely accepted approach to such measurement is to introduce the concept of persistence of profitability. The intuition behind this procedure is that if there were competition in the market, firms with high profitability in one period would not have high profitability in a subsequent period. If the competition was intense, there will be no, or very little, serial correlation between profits in one period, and profits in subsequent periods. There is now a standard methodology for implementing systematically this intuition. The methodology may be stated as follows:
PP studies, it will be recalled, are based on the following autoregressive equation applied to the time series of profitability of individual firms. 
As is usual in PP studies, to control for business cycles and other macroeconomic shocks, the regression analysis is conducted in terms of the variable Yi,t = πi,tπt , where πt is the average of the πi,t across firms. The measure Yit represents the deviation of firm i's profitability at time t from the profitability of all other firms in the country at that time. The analysis is based on models of the form:
where i, 1i and 2i are coefficients and the it are random errors. The empirical analysis shows that this AR2 model is sufficient to capture the dynamics in all cases in the seven emerging countries examined in this study.
From (3), the statistic YiLR = αi / (1-λ1i -λ2i) can be derived to indicate firm i's long-term profitability relative to the country average. If 2i=0, then the estimate of 1i provides a direct measure of the speed of adjustment of profitability following a shock. Assuming λ1i(0,1), adjustment to equilibrium is monotonic. Where 2i is not zero or λ1i (-1, 0), adjustment is non-monotonic and there is no unique way of characterising its speed based on the estimated parameters. [See further Goddard and Wilson (1999) ].
Most of the work on the application of the above model has been done on developed countries. Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) is the only comprehensive study of competition intensity in developing countries. The three authors provide empirical results on the state of competition in seven major markets -Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Korea, Jordan and Zimbabwe.
There are two other papers which also consider developing countries, one is by Kambhampati (1995) with respect to India and the other is by
Yurtöglu (2004) with respect to Turkey. The findings of Kambhampati's paper are open to some debate as these are based on data that cannot reject the unit root hypothesis in the vast majority of cases using standard methods. This creates difficulties for the statistical and economic interpretation of empirical results in PP studies. Glen et al (op cit) overcome these problems by using the more powerful Im-Pesaran test, that by exploiting the panel structure of the data allows us to reject nonstationarity of profitability. The astonishing substantive result from these studies is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the intensity of competition in leading emerging markets is certainly no less than that observed in advanced countries.
This model is applied by Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) to data from seven emerging countries -Brazil India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and Zimbabwe, and the results are reported in Table 2 . Profitability is measured by the return on net assets of the firm. The sample frame is the hundred largest firms quoted on the stock market in each country.
The estimated values of λi and the proportion of firms for which YiLR are either significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for emerging markets are reported in Table 2 . The exactly corresponding values of these variables for advanced countries, estimated by other researchers, are reported in Tables 3 and 4 .
The results indicate that the λ for developing countries is considerably smaller than that for advanced countries. It lies in the region of 0.013 and 0.421. The corresponding results for the value of λ of advanced countries indicate that the values of this parameter lies in the region of 0.50. This suggests, in the normal discourse of the persistence of profitability studies that there is greater competition in developing countries than in advanced countries. This empirical conclusion is contrary to most economists'
expectations. There are similarly many barriers to entry into these markets, however 2007) points out that there are a number of structural factors in developing countries which are also procompetition. These include the low quality and simplicity of products demanded, contest-based competition whereby subsidies are given only in exchange for the firms meeting performance standards.
There have been some recent advances in the methodology applied to persistency of profitability studies and there are new results. Adelina Gschwandtner (2012) has analysed and compared persistence of profits in three periods for the US economy -1950 US economy - -66, 1967 US economy - -83 and 1984 . One notable feature of this study is that, whereas the previous scholars have only considered the set of surviving firms, Gschwandtner considers both surviving and non-surviving firms. Her results are totally plausible. She finds that the intensity of competition in the US economy increased systematically over time during the half century she examined. She found the main determinants of profit persistence to be the firms and industry size, industry growth, risk and advertising.
IV. Economic Theory and Competition Policy in Emerging Countries
Recent advances in economic theory, particularly agency theory, transaction cost theory, and information theory, have greatly enriched our understanding of how competition and competition policy may work in various spheres of an economy and in different economies. Thus, a leading authority on the theory of industrial organization has recently observed:
"Competition is an unambiguously good thing in the first-best world of economists. That world assumes large numbers of participants in all markets, no public goods, no externalities, no information asymmetries, no natural monopolies, complete markets, fully rational economic agents, a benevolent court system to enforce contracts, and a benevolent government providing lump sum transfers to achieve any desirable redistribution. Because developing countries are so far from this ideal world, it is not always the case that competition should be encouraged in these countries" (italics added) (Laffont, 1998, p.237) .
This author provides a number of examples to support his contention. All of these involve what economists call the theory of the "second best." The latter asserts that, if any one of the assumptions required for the validity of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics cannot be met, restricted rather than unrestricted competition may be a superior strategy. Laffont draws particular attention to the "demonization" by many economists (including those at the World Bank) of cross subsidization of different groups by large public utilities. However, he points out that in developing countries, where, in practice, taxes cannot be collected from the wealthy for re-distribution, it may be a good strategy for the government to require public utilities in these countries to subsidize poor consumers in the countryside at the expense of richer residents in the city. It may be useful to note here that cross-subsidisation is widely used in advanced countries as well.
Laffont suggests that even if competition policy of the kind followed by advanced countries such as the US or the UK were appropriate for poor African countries, they are a long way from having the institutional capacity to implement such policies. The implementation of a comprehensive competition policy requires a strong state which many developing countries at low levels of industrialization do not have.
Therefore, at the very least, for such countries there will need to be far fewer and simpler competition rules which are capable of being enforced.
Clearly it would be unfair, if not absurd, to subject a Sierra Leone to the same competition policy disciplines as the US.
We now turn to the consideration of the case of the semi-industrial countries, many of which are now fairly advanced in industrial development, e.g. Korea, India, Brazil, Mexico. These countries have reasonably strong states with competent government machinery. However, economic theory suggests that, even for these economies, the US and UK types of competition policies may be inappropriate. A very important reason for this conclusion is that the essential focus of competition policy in advanced countries such as the US is the promotion of allocative efficiency and reduced prices for consumers (WTO 1997 This suggests that unfettered competition may not be appropriate for a developing economy. Economic theory as well as experience indicate that, in the real world of incomplete and missing markets, unfettered competition may lead to price wars and ruinous rivalry and therefore may be inimical to future investment: from this perspective, too much competition can be as harmful as too little. What is required by developing economies is an optimal degree of competition which would entail sufficient rivalry to reduce inefficiency in the corporate use of resources at the microeconomic level, but not so much competition that it would deter the propensity to invest. This central analytical point is altogether ignored in competition policy discourse in countries such as the US where the concept of optimal degree of competition is simply assumed to be maximum competition, that is, the more competition the better. 7
V. Competition Policy in Japan and Korea
It is useful in this context to reflect on the operation of competition policy in Japan in the period 1950-1973. The Japanese economy achieved historically unprecedented growth during this time span: its manufacturing production rose at a phenomenal rate of about 13 per cent a year, GDP at 10 per cent a year, and its share in world exports of manufacture rose by a huge 10 percentage points (Singh, 1998) . A central role in this spectacular economic advance was played by the very high rates of savings and investment in the Japanese economy. As noted earlier, the competition policy was subordinated to industrial policy, an essential concern of which was to maintain the private sector's high propensity to invest. For this purpose, the Japanese government's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) frequently imposed restrictions on product market competition. Amsden and Singh (1994) As a result of lax enforcement of competition policy, Korea has one of the highest levels of industrial concentration in the world. However, the giant conglomerates compete with each other fiercely. A significant part of the competition has been of the non-market variety in which the chaebol have competed for government support. The latter has been given in return for meeting specified performance targets for exports, new product development, and technological change. In the market place, the chaebol competed for market share, as that determined their subsequent investment allocations in a particular industry 9 . As in Japan between 1950-1973, the Korean government until recently has purposefully co-ordinated industrial investments by competing chaebol, so as to prevent overcapacity and too much competition (Chang, 1994) .
8 Source of these statistics, see among others Singh (2012) . 9 There was heavy emphasis in the Korean industrialisation programme on import controls which many South Korean companies practiced. Without such protection the particular path of industrialisation chosen by South Korea may not have worked.
VI. New Developments in the Theory of Industrial Organization
The policies adopted by these East Asian countries find endorsement in the new developments in economic theory. Essentially, modern economic theory suggests that dynamic efficiency is best promoted by a combination of co-operation and competition between firms rather than by maximum or unfettered competition (Graham and Richardson, 1997) .
It has been suggested by some scholars and high US government officials that the 1997-2000 financial crisis in Asia demonstrates the failure of statedirected capitalism of the Asian countries. However, a careful analysis of these issues indicates that the crisis was caused not by too much state direction but rather by too little. Overinvestment by the chaebol in Korea or the property bubble in Thailand were caused essentially by the fact that these countries were pursuing capital account liberalization in the period immediately before the crisis. Korea had become a member of the OECD in the early 1990s and in fact had abolished its planning agency. Neither industrial overinvestment by the chaebol nor excessive investment in the property sector in Thailand would have occurred had the governments coordinated investment activity as before. 10
In addition to the discussion of the above issues in relation to Laffont and economic theory, another major analysis of this paper is that competition policy that is appropriate for developing countries and takes into account the "development dimension" cannot and should not be the same as the 10 For various interpretations of the Asian financial crisis see Singh (1998b Singh ( , 1999a ; Singh and Weisse (1999) ;
Radelet and Sachs (1998); US Council of Economic Advisors (1999); IMF (1998); World Bank (1999) .
policy that is implemented in advanced countries such as the US and the European Union economies 11 .
It is also strongly argued here that the kind of competition policy needed in developing countries is not only different from that for advanced countries but to do justice to the particularities of the development process, a different language is needed. The conduct of the normal current discourse in international fora in terms of the language and the framework of the WTOmarket access, national treatment, reciprocity and the most favoured nation clausedoes not do justice to the economic conditions prevailing in developing countries; indeed, such concepts are arguably prejudicial to developmental needs in this specific context.
It is also suggested here that the new concepts which should be introduced into the discourse for addressing the developmental dimension are thoroughly grounded in modern economic theory and there is considerable national and international empirical evidence to support them. However, it must be added, that these elements are new only in relation to the current international discourse on the subject. These are widely used in the theory and practice of industrial organization. Indeed some of these are implicit in the WTO agreements themselvessee for example the discussion of the agreement on intellectual property rights.
VII. Competitiveness and Economic Development
We The UK, provides for an advanced economy, an apt illustration of its lack of competitiveness in the mid 1970s. Following the first oil price shock of 1973-74, the UK economy which was then not a major producer and exporter of oil, suffered an adverse movement in its terms of trade. Howes and Singh (2000) Empirical evidence from industrial countries suggest that countries like Japan and Germany, whose share of the world markets increased between 1963-75, despite the fact that their prices and costs relative to other countries, were rising. This paradox was first examined by the Late Professor Kaldor and subsequently confirmed over an extended period by Faberberg (1996 , Table 1 .) The paradox is best explained by the fact that a great deal of international competition takes place in non-price terms rather than in terms of prices. The reason for the positive association between productivity growth and market share is that countries with high rates of productivity growth also have high rates of investment and output growth. Howes and Singh note that such countries thereby achieve faster technical progress, greater learning-by-doing and quicker development of new products. If one considers the history of the last ten to twelve years, there cannot be much doubt of the competitive deficit of the US economy.
The US has been running current account deficit which have been of the order of 5 per cent of GDP at the full employment level of income. These, in turn have led to global imbalances which certainly increased financial fragility in the world economy, even though these may not have been the main causal factor. Both competition policy and industrial policy have a role to play in this re-balancing of the US economy.
VIII. Competition and competition policy in the economic history of

East Asia
Until relatively recently there were serious issues in relation to competition policy and economic history. These controversies arose in their most acute form in relation to the economic history of East Asian countries. The historic assessment of the role of competition and competition policies in these countries as well as their implications for the other countries are critical issues in these debates. to what extent, if any, the Japanese followed the Report's prescriptions and a market-friendly approach to development. Did the Japanese government intervene in the markets "reluctantly"? Did it, for example, leave prices and production priorities to be determined by market forces and simply provide the necessary infrastructure for private enterprise to flourish?
How "transparent" was government intervention in Japanese industry? To achieve its colossal economic success, how closely did the Japanese economy integrate with the world economy?
The neoclassical analysis now accepts that the optimal degree of openness for a country is not "close" integration with the global economy through free trade (Krugman, 1987; Rodrik, 1992) . In that case, what is the optimal degree of openness for the economy? This extremely important policy question, however, is not seriously addressed by the orthodox theory. Chakravarty and Singh (1988) provide an alternative theoretical perspective for considering this issue. To put it briefly, they argue that Asian experience of "strategic" rather than "close" integration with the world economy is fully comprehensible within this kind of theoretical framework.
X. Multilateral Competition Policy: The main issues between the North and the South
The basic idea of multilateral competition policy is that all member countries of the WTO become subject to the same competition policy disciplines. The South does not approve of this idea for the simple reason that WTO disciplines contain Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) which can lead to cross sanctions for the offending parties: the winning party can enforce sanctions against the offender in a totally different area than where the offence occurred. It is for similar but opposite reasons that the North approves of a multinational competition policy. It would like a strongly enforced competition agreement which will be binding on all countries.
The North had originally put forward a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) during 1995-1998. The agreement was drafted and proposed by the OECD. Under the terms of this agreement, basically any country could invest anywhere, produce anything without let or hindrance from any government. The MAI was draconian with respect to developing countries. Instead of level playing fields this kind of arrangement would have resulted in developing countries being even more handicapped than before. Developed country firms are far more capable than those from developing countries and thus in free competition the latter would have been annihilated. In the event strong opposition to this idea came from not only developing countries but also from countries like France. The MAI was finally withdrawn and in its place a much milder multilateral agreement was subsequently proposed by advanced countries through the European Community.
This proposal was much more modest and intended to meet the criticism of developing countries in relation to MAI. The EC's proposed multilateral agreement on competition policies comprised the following main elements.
a. All member countries should declare hard-core cartels to be illegal.
Countries should cooperate in implementing such a ban. Other than this ban on hard-core cartels countries can have any provisions in their competition laws as they like.
b. However, these domestic competition laws should be in conformity with the core WTO principles of MFN, non-discrimination, national treatment, transparency and procedural fairness.
c. Since the proposal is for a multilateral agreement under the WTO, it is therefore subject to the organisation's dispute settlement mechanism. In response to objections from both rich and poor countries, the EC further agreed to limit the scope of the application of WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) in the manner specified below.
i. Thus the proposals stress that "WTO dispute settlement would be strictly limited-as is also currently the case under the DSUto complaints brought forward by WTO members. Private individuals and firms would have no standing therefore" (EC 2003 pp2).
ii. The proposals suggest: "we also agree with this view, and strongly believe that dispute settlement should be strictly limited to assessing the overall conformity of the actual law, regulations and guidelines of general applications against the core principles contained in a WTO agreement, including a ban on hard core cartels".
iii. In addition the proposals indicate that the DSU would recognise the "specific circumstances of developing country members" in considering a dispute.
iv. The proposals also contain an informal peer review in relation to On the face of it these EC proposals would seem to be entirely reasonable to which nobody should be able to object. The claim is that the proposed multilateral competition policy for the whole world involves only a minimum set of rules on which all right-minded people everywhere would agree. It is recognised that many developing countries will, nevertheless, not have the capacity to implement competition laws and so assistance with capacity building is an important part of the EC proposals.
At this point it may be useful to introduce explicitly into this discussion the concept of special and differential treatment 12 for developing countries whose guiding principle, it may be recalled, is non-reciprocity. Specifically, it is proposed that advanced country governments should legislate that anti-competitive conduct that is illegal within their jurisdictions would also be illegal when carried out by these firms in any developing country.
Further, that citizens and corporations in developing countries who are harmed by these illegal practices can sue for damages in the courts of advanced countries and that there should be a fund to facilitate such legal action. The principle behind this recommendation is the same as that established regarding corruption.
Returning finally to the multilateral aspect of the EC's competition policy under the aegis of the WTO, there are important arguments from the perspective of the organization itself against such an arrangement.
Competition policy is a complex undertaking, which is certainly required today as a discipline on large multinational companies in a globalized world. This is an enormous challenge that cannot be undertaken by an institution that is already overloaded. Apart from anything else, there are good organizational reasons for the WTO to remain sharply focused and to use its accumulated capabilities to their best advantage. Moreover, it is not just a matter of cartel conduct that needs to be regulated but also other 12 See further kinds of market conduct that reduce the ease of entry into international markets due to the anti-competitive conduct of dominant firms. For example, if private harmful cartels are banned, theory and evidence suggest that these will often be replaced by full-scale mergers between the previously cartelised, and often convicted firms. Levenstein et al., 2003 provide recent evidence on this matter.
In considering these competition proposals it is also important to emphasize the fact that the links between competition policy and international trade are no more significant than, say, tax policy and international trade, infrastructure deficiencies and international trade, or education and international trade. As the Strategic Structural Initiative
Talks between the US and Japan showed, there were more than one hundred ways in which trade between these countries was arguably being distorted. It would therefore be best for the WTO to confine itself to its core competences regarding strictly trade matters, rather than overextend through mission creep to an endless string of trade-related matters. This would be not just in the interests of developing countries but also be of benefit to the world at large.
Last but not the least, developing countries face more difficult problems from a whole gamut of bilateral treaties involving significantly the US and a wide range of poor, and not so poor developing countries. These treaties are usually one-sided giving United States much more leverage than it would get in a multilateral negotiated agreement. The speed at which the US is proceeding on these bilateral treaties provide little room for comfort for developing countries. They have no option but to oppose these antidevelopment treaties the best they can under the present economic and political arrangements for the world economy.
XI. CONCLUSION
The main argument of this paper is that the multilateral competition policy proposed by the EU is neither suitable from the perspective of developing countries nor from that of the world economy as a whole. As far as developing countries are concerned, the policy goes too far in instituting homogenization of competition policy and thus deprives them of important developmental instruments. On the other hand, from an international perspective, the proposed policy is too feeble to deal with the challenges posed by large multinational corporations intent on monopolizing world markets.
To deal with this, what is required is greater policy autonomy for developing countries and at the same time a more stringent framework for dealing with mammoth multinational companies and their endless appetite for overseas expansion often through mergers and takeovers. Both the EC's proposals on competition policy and on FDI seem more concerned to provide TNCs with additional tools to give them unfettered access to developing countries and undermine the latter's ability to control the economy and foster their own domestic companies and national economic development.
What are the policy implications of this wide ranging analysis of competition and competition policy issues? The main policy implication is that time has come for the establishment of a development oriented international competition authority to control anti-competitive conduct and particularly growth by mergers of large multinationals.
The characteristics and responsibilities of this Authority would include: should be the same as that of developing countries would not be an easy gospel to preach. This however, seems to be the only way forward to meet the challenges of fast growing population, global warming and other extremely difficult problems which the world economy faces.
Although international co-operation on competition policy, would be of particular benefit to developing countries, it also has useful features to assist the large multinational corporations. The International Competition Authority would for example be able to provide multinationals under its purview with unambiguous decisions on mergers and other competition related matters. Instead of being subject to the often-conflicting decisions of many different jurisdictions (e.g. the United States, the European Community, Japan, and over time countries like India and China).
International Competition Authority's rulings would prevail over all national and regional jurisdictions.
There is no illusion that an international agreement of the above kind would immediately be acceptable to advanced countries. Nevertheless, it indicates the nature of economic arrangements in this area, which would best serve the developmental needs of poor countries. It may, however, be helpful to proceed to the establishment of the ICA in stages. At the first stage, the Authority may have no coercive powers but simply be able to monitor and to report on abuses of dominant market positions, on mergers, and the Authority's other competition objectives 13 . Such monitoring would itself be beneficial to developing countries as it would provide them with information on cartels and on market power abuses of multinationals.
Developing countries would find it difficult to acquire such information otherwise. With the experience gained from this kind of limited international co-operation, nations can, over time, work towards greater co-operation by giving ICA the necessary powers to enforce its rules. The above line of reasoning has been subject to penetrating criticism by the editors. This is mainly on the ground that there are serious concerns from developing countries point of view about all such international authorities, that however good the intentions, they end up being unfair simply because of the reality of global power. How would this concern be addressed directly, would it not be safer to avoid such a global authority and instead suggest common approaches by a set of developing countries towards the MNCs.
The referees point is well taken but unfortunately there are few levers of power available to developing countries. They have to do the best they can with the limited instruments at their disposal. Solidarity between developing countries is certainly one area which these countries will need to explore thoroughly. Instead of abandoning from the outset any prospects for a compromise, it would be better to consider such possibilities as a part of a global solution. There is no presumption in this context that developed countries will not do what is in their best interests. They will need to be persuaded that the kind of proposal suggested here will ultimately also be in their interests. For such proposals to work the world's developing countries would certainly have to embrace South-South cooperation.
Indeed, they may also have to cultivate North-South cooperation to make it easier for developed countries to participate in such projects which would be of common benefit to humanity. a -Based on pre-tax rates of return / net assets b -Estimations are for industry groups. Estimates of lambda ( are from a range of specifications for the persistence model, which differ across industries. c -Estimate based on pooled data for 128 industry groups. The mean lambda ( has been estimated by the present authors from the data in Table 3 of Waring (1996) . Source: Goddard and Wilson (1999) 
